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DAVID VELLEMAN
REPLIES TO DISCUSSION ON
THE POSSIBILITY OF PRACTICAL REASON
The critiques of Jonathan Dancy and Al Mele give me an
opportunity to clear up some misunderstandings of my view.
Nadeem Hussain’s critique gives me an opportunity to revise
the view in some crucial respects. I am grateful for both
opportunities.
1. DANCY
Dancy asks whether the self-knowledge at which an agent aims,
in my view, is knowledge of what he is currently doing or
knowledge of what he is going to do. In the first instance, I
think an agent aims at the former. But Dancy may find my view
confusing because I also think that an agent’s primary means of
attaining the former is by attaining a short-term version of the
latter. In my view, an agent wants it to be the case that he
knows, at any given time, what he is doing at that time, but he
ensures this outcome by not doing anything until he knows that
he is going to do it. This knowledge is of course practical
knowledge of the sort that causes what is known – causes it, in
my view, by way of the agent’s inclination to do what he thinks,
so that his thinking it will constitute knowledge of what he is
doing. But the fact remains that the agent attains contempo-
raneous knowledge of his actions by attaining anticipatory
knowledge of them.
Dancy then objects that I frequently shift between saying, on
the one hand, that an agent wants to know what he is doing and,
on the other, that he wants to know why he is doing it, or to
make sense of what he is doing. As Dancy later acknowledges, I
raise and answer this very objection in the Introduction to the
book (26–27). My view is that an agent wants to know a
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description of his action that implicitly explains why he is per-
forming it. The way I put it in my Introduction is that he wants
to ‘‘grasp [his] bodily movements under concepts that set them
in an explanatory context of motives and circumstances’’ (p. 27).
Dancy next turns to my view that a reason for doing
something is a consideration in light of which, were the agent to
do that thing, he would know what he was doing in this
explanatory sense. Dancy’s first question about the view is how
it accounts for reasons against doing something. No problem.
Reasons against doing something, on my view, are consider-
ations in light of which doing that thing would be unintelligible
or hard to understand. For example, Dancy’s recognition that
he does not need new shoes makes it harder rather than easier
to understand why he is shopping for shoes. The description
‘‘buying shoes I don’t need’’ therefore incorporates a reason
against buying shoes rather than a reason for buying them. If
Dancy becomes puzzled as to why he is buying yet another pair
of shoes, he might well express his puzzlement by asking himself
‘‘What am I doing?’’ ‘‘Buying shoes I don’t need’’ would not
answer this question except in a perversely literal sense, since it
offers no clue as to what would explain his doing such a thing.
The question clearly aims at obtaining a description that relates
the action to his motives and circumstances in a way that ex-
plains it.
Dancy next asks why the screams of a torturer’s victim do
not count, on my view, as reasons for the torturer to continue,
given that, upon considering his actions in light of them, he
knows what he is doing – namely, causing intolerable pain.
Nothing I say remotely suggests that considerations acquire the
force of reasons by alerting the agent to what he is doing in the
sense of what effects he is producing.
When Dancy finally considers the possibility that I am
talking about knowledge that incorporates explanatory mate-
rial, he goes on to argue that an agent can explain his action
only in terms of reasons in favor of performing it, and he im-
plies that I have somehow substituted this clear and plausible
conception of self-knowledge for my own, unclear and
implausible conception. As in the previous instance, however, I
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explicitly raise and answer this objection in my book (p. 26).
Before repeating the answer here, I want to forestall misun-
derstandings that are likely to be caused by Dancy’s distinction
between ‘‘normative’’ and ‘‘motivating’’ reasons.
I prefer to distinguish between justifying reasons, or reasons-
for, and explanatory reasons, or reasons-why. Having Parkin-
son’s disease can be the reason why someone trembles without
in any way being a reason for him to tremble – which is to say,
it can explain without justifying. What complicates this dis-
tinction is that justifying reasons must be capable of entering
into explanatory reasons, since a reason for acting must have
the potential to influence a rational agent, in which case it may
become a part of the reason why he acts. And the psychological
process by which a justifying reason influences a rational agent
can also be triggered by considerations that do not in fact
justify, in which case the explanatory reason for the agent’s
action can include a consideration to which he responded as if it
were a justifying reason even though it was not. Whether or not
the consideration influencing an agent in this way has the force
of a justification, it is said to be the agent’s reason for acting, or
the reason for which he acted – expressions whose definition
requires the concepts of both justifying and explanatory rea-
sons. A reason for which someone acts is a consideration that
explains his action because he responded to it as if it justified (as
it may or may not have done).
Here is why I prefer to avoid the expression ‘‘motivating
reason’’. In Davidson’s philosophy of action, which still dom-
inates the intuitions of analytic philosophers, the psychological
process of being motivated by a desire and belief is said to be
one and the same as the process of being influenced by a jus-
tifying reason. As I explain in the Introduction to my book and
in the paper entitled ‘‘The Guise of the Good,’’ I believe that
these are two distinct processes, mistakenly conflated by
Davidson. An agent can act on or out of motives without acting
for any reason at all, because being motivated does not in itself
entail responding to anything as a justification. I therefore
prefer to reserve the term ‘‘motivating’’ for the one process and
‘‘reason’’ for the other.
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Here is what I say in the Introduction to my book:
[T]here is a definition of ‘making sense’ under which it is a term of practical
rationality. What makes sense for someone to do, by this definition, is
whatever he has reason for doing. The statement that reasons for an action
are the considerations in light of which the action would make sense can
therefore sound like a tautology. But I do not mean to speak tautologically.
When I speak of ‘‘making sense,’’ I am borrowing the phrase from the domain
of theoretical reason, where it is used to characterize phenomena as suscep-
tible to explanation and understanding. What makes sense to someone, the-
oretically speaking, is what he can explain. This is what Imeanwhen I say that
reasons for doing something are considerations in light of which it would
make sense. Imean that they are considerations thatwould provide the subject
with an explanatory grasp of the behavior for which they are reasons. (26)
In other words, the ‘‘explanatory context of motives and cir-
cumstances’’ that is provided by a justifying reason for acting, in
my view, is one that explains the action in the theoretical sense,
in terms of what actuates the agent under the circumstances.
As I have just said, of course, part of what actuates an agent
can be a justifying reason to which he responds in a rational
manner. But in my view, that justifying reason must be a
consideration citing something else that actuates him, anteced-
ently to its own rational influence, because it acquires that
influence precisely by rendering the action intelligible to the
agent – which it cannot do solely on the grounds of this very
influence. The ‘‘something else’’ actuating the agent, and cited
in the justifying reason, is often a motive, influencing the agent
through a psychological process that is pre-rational in my view.
The agent then understands his behavior as shaped by two
influences – his motive and this very understanding of his
behavior in light of it. As I explain in the title paper of the
volume, I regard action as a process of rationally regulated
activity, in which the activity that is regulated by reason must
be actuated by antecedent forces.
Perhaps Dancy is so confused about my conception of rea-
sons for acting because he has ignored all but the Introduction
to my book. He says:
I am conscious, in all this, of having concentrated on three pages in the
introduction to a 280-page collection. My reason for concentrating on those
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pages is that they contain the most explicit treatment of what it is to be a
reason; the topic is also treated on pp. 197–199, but there the discussion is
interwoven with other considerations and less easy to pin down.
What’s odd about this admission is that the passage to which it
refers, on pp. 197–198, belongs to the end of the title essay,
which I disavow in the Introduction as ‘‘tortured’’ and
‘‘unworkable’’. Stranger still is that Dancy appears to have
thought of himself as criticizing a view that is included in the
introductory narrative and then mentioned only incidentally,
‘‘interwoven with other considerations,’’ on a total of two other
pages. Should not this characterization have led to the suspi-
cion that the view he criticizes is not what the book is about?
As it happens, the book contains slightly more material on
this view than Dancy appears to have recognized. The paper
entitled ‘‘The Story of Rational Action’’ argues that the axioms
of formal decision theory qualify as norms of rationality be-
cause preferences that satisfy them are guaranteed to be char-
acterizable in integrative terms, giving the agent self-knowledge
of the kind that is typically embodied in reasons, according to
my view. Attention to pp. 156–169 of this paper might have
saved Dancy from some of the misunderstandings on which his
critique is based.
2. MELE
Al Mele appears to think that my focus on ‘‘full-blooded’’ ac-
tion, or action ‘‘par excellence,’’ manifests narrow-mindedness
or perhaps even elitism about kinds of behavior. Yet this focus
is fairly common in the philosophy of action, and for good
philosophical reasons.
The extension of a concept like ‘‘action’’ is not determined
by necessary and sufficient conditions that philosophy can
articulate. The extension of such a concept is determined by
stereotypes, or paradigm cases, which specific instances
approximate more or less. How closely a bit of behavior must
approximate these paradigms in order to qualify as an action,
or how far it can depart from them while still qualifying, are
context-dependent questions, to which there is no single
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answer. What is close enough in one context will be too far
away in another, and the relevant variables include normative
or evaluative features of the context. The range of what we’re
willing count as your doing may expand or contract in response
to what is at stake.
Hence there are two different questions, one of which is
clearly more fundamental than the other. The first question is
how to characterize the stereotypes or paradigms approxima-
tion to which determines the extension of the concept ‘‘action’’.
The second is how to characterize the dimensions along which
instances can depart from the paradigm, and the contextual
variables that determine how much of a departure is too much.
Given the clear priority of the former question, there should be
no objection to starting the philosophy of action with the
paradigm cases.
Of course, Mele’s charge may be, not that I start with the
paradigm cases, but that I never get beyond them. To this
charge I plead guilty. But I would cite, as mitigating circum-
stances, the philosophical problems raised by the paradigms of
action – problems that further justify focusing on those cases.
The human capacity to chew gum may raise interesting ques-
tions, I suppose, but they are nothing compared with the
questions raised by the capacity to deliberate between alterna-
tive futures and to bring one of them about for good reason.
How can there be alternative futures, and how can we bring
them about, in a world where the future is caused by the past,
or by nothing at all? How can anything have the normative
force of a good reason for bringing about one future rather
than another?
To be frank, I suspect that Mele is not interested in these
questions. As I understand him, he is interested in character-
izing a particular stretch of the human world, whatever it may
turn out to contain and hence whether or not it contains choices
or reasons or autonomous actions worthy of those descriptions.
Or, to put it another way, he thinks that ‘‘choice’’, ‘‘reason’’,
and ‘‘action’’ are not descriptions but names, denoting what-
ever there is in that stretch of the human world to which they
are applied.
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My belief is that these terms have descriptive content in
virtue of which they may not apply to anything in our world –
or in any other world, for that matter, if their content is, as it
sometimes seems, fundamentally incoherent. In light of this
belief, I choose to focus on the paradigm cases that raise this
prospect most vividly. In doing so, I am not showing a lack of
interest in the full range of human actions; I am just showing an
interest in those paradigm cases where the fundamental philo-
sophical problems lie.
The primary target of Mele’s criticism is my view about the
constitutive aim of action, and its similarity to the constitutive
aim of belief. Early in his critique, Mele cites a single paren-
thetical remark of mine as grounds for attributing to me the
claim that constitutive aims are identical with criteria of success.
I claim no such identity. What I say is that constitutive aims
provide criteria of success. Unfortunately, Mele interprets me as
saying that criteria of success also provide constitutive aims, and
this misinterpretation undermines much of what follows.
A constitutive aim is something pursuit of which is essential
to the constitution of some process or activity. Kicking a ball
around on a field does not amount to playing the game of soccer
unless one is trying to kick the ball into the net more times than
one’s opponent. Of course, one can try to lose a game of soccer,
but as I explain in my book, trying to lose a game is the pursuit
of a second-order goal, the goal of failing in an attempt to win. If
this second-order pursuit of failing to win ever collapses into a
first-order pursuit of losing simpliciter, then one is no longer
playing the game – as one’s opponent might justifiably complain
– and so there is no game for one to lose.
The constitutive goal of a game – the object of the game, as we
call it – determines a criterion of success at playing it. But many
processes and activities have criteria of success that are not
associated with constitutive aims. It is a criterion of success in the
activity of contributing to a book symposium that one address
the views actually expressed in the book. But one need not aim at
this goal in order to engage in the activity. Indeed, this particular
activity has no constitutive aim that I can think of. Hence criteria
of success do not necessarily generate constitutive aims.
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I will shortly come to Mele’s remarks on the constitutive aim
of action, but first let me deal with his remarks on the consti-
tutive aim of belief. These remarks are introduced by a mélange
of decontextualized quotations that may mislead an innocent
reader as to what I actually say. Mele quotes a statement on p.
17 of my book to the effect that belief aims at the truth in the
sense that it is constitutively regulated by mechanisms designed
to ensure that it is true. He then quotes a statement from a
footnote to another chapter: ‘‘The concept of design encom-
passes the work of the pseudo-designer known as evolution.’’
He fails to note that the book has a chapter entitled ‘‘On the
Aim of Belief,’’ from which neither of these quotations is taken
and in which I clearly state that the evolutionary design of our
cognitive systems is only one of many ways in which belief
might acquire its aim (pp. 252–253 and note 18 on p. 253).
Mele then quotes the following passage:
If it can be a natural or scientific fact that belief aims to be true, then it can
also be a natural or scientific fact that false beliefs are wrong or incorrect,
which is the fact underlying the normativity generally attributed to content.
The hope of naturalizing that normativity is thus a reason for being inter-
ested in how belief aims at the truth.
Mele fails to say that this passage is drawn from an explanation
of why one might be interested in the aim of belief, and that it
carries a footnote beginning as follows: ‘‘Naturalizing the aim
of belief is not on my agenda for this paper’’ (p. 245, n. 3; see
also p. 253, n. 18). In other words, the reason which Mele here
quotes me as adducing for being interested in the aim of belief is
one that I explicitly disavow as my reason in the paper from
which this quotation is drawn.
It is true that, in the Introduction to the book, I endorse a
strategy for reducing the aim of belief to naturalistic facts. It is
also true that, because I regard aiming at the truth as a con-
ceptual requirement for an attitude to qualify as a belief, I
should not begin sentences with the clause ‘‘if it can be a sci-
entific fact that belief aims to be true…’’. I should say, instead,
‘‘if it can be a scientific fact that some of our cognitions aim at
the truth, thus qualifying as beliefs…’’. The fact expressed in
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the latter, more precise clause is as far as I would go in treating
the aim of belief as a scientific fact: it is an aim such that a
token attitude’s having it can be a scientific fact about that
attitude token. My chapter on belief makes clear, I think, that I
would never go to the extent of saying that science can discover
what aim, if any, an attitude must have in order to qualify as a
belief. In my view, ‘‘belief’’ is not a rigid designator for a
natural kind of attitude, a kind whose nature remains to be
discovered. Our concept of belief has a fairly rich descriptive
content, and what science can discover is whether, and how,
that concept is satisfied by attitudes that we have.
Mele refers to his 2001 discussion of empirical research
indicating that what we call beliefs are regulated by a mecha-
nism designed, not to ensure that they are true, but rather to
prevent ‘‘costly errors’’. He suggests that if this research turns
out to be right, then my claim about the aim of belief must be
wrong. The research he cites is James Friedrich’s ‘‘primary er-
ror detection and minimization’’ (PEDMIN) model, according
to which the ordinary person’s testing of hypotheses is biased
by the difference between the perceived cost of mistakenly
accepting an hypothesis and the perceived cost of mistakenly
rejecting it. Mele neglects to mention that my chapter on belief
discusses the possibility that belief-forming mechanisms are
biased by design (pp. 254–255; see also n. 22 on 254):
Evolution or education may have given us dispositions to err on the side of
caution in perceiving predators, to overestimate our own popularity, and so
on. But my thesis is not that belief is completely shielded from mechanisms
that tend to make it false; my thesis is that belief is necessarily subject to
mechanisms designed to make it true.
In most cases, the latter mechanisms retain some influence, despite inter-
ference from the former.…Unlike an optical illusion or a phantasy, a biased
belief usually responds to indications of the truth, however imperfectly.
Even if Mele overlooked this passage, he might have recalled
his own response to the claim that Friedrich’s hypothesis mil-
itates against the truth-directedness of belief:
It might be claimed that motivation to discover the truth about p is PED-
MIN motivation on the grounds that wanting to discover the truth about p
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is a matter of wanting to avoid certain errors – the error of not believing that
p if p is true and the error of not believing that ~p if ~p is true. … This claim
would undermine the contention that PEDMIN motivation, as opposed to
motivation to discover the truth, is at work at a given time. The claim
implies that when motivation to discover the truth is operative, it is an
instance of PEMDIN motivation. [Mele 2001, p. 40]
I would make only one correction to this passage. The errors at
issue do not consist in not believing things that are true. Failing
to believe a truth is never a cognitive error (although it may be
a pragmatic error, if that particular truth is of some practical
importance). The errors at issue consist in believing things that
are false. With that correction, the foregoing passage of Mele’s
explains why Friedrich’s hypothesis is no threat to mine.
When Mele comes to my views on the constitutive aim of
action, his discussion suffers increasingly from his mistaken but
frequently reiterated belief that I identify constitutive aims with
criteria of success. He offers various alternative aims that might
be constitutive of action, or of decisions to act, each aim being
derived from a criterion of success that might reasonably be
applied to actions or decisions. None of these derivations would
be supported by premises attributable to me. As one might ex-
pect, Mele finds it impossible to transform some criteria of
success into plausible constitutive aims without considerable
adjustment, which he accomplishes by adding clauses to exclude
‘‘Freudian’’ or ‘‘deviant’’ processes, without any explanation as
to what justifies these additional clauses. Hence his examples do
not even carry out the strategy of derivation that he mistakenly
attributes to me. Because these examples are twice removed
from any relevance to my view, I will comment only on one or
two, which happen to provide some occasion for clarification.
Mele suggests at one point that we might identify the crite-
rion of success for action as the execution of a decision,
whereupon (he notes) we would have to ask ourselves what the
criterion of success for a decision might be. And he considers
the following possibilities:
Some theorists may claim that the criterion is ‘‘the good’’: a decision* is
successful just in case the course of action decided on is good. Others may
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assert that the criterion is ‘‘the rational’’: a decision* is successful just in case
the course of action decided on is rational.
Mele neglects to mention that my book contains arguments
against both of these proposals – one in the paper entitled ‘‘The
Guise of the Good,’’ the other in the title paper, ‘‘The Possi-
bility of Practical Reason’’. These arguments are prominently
featured in these papers and are deserving of at least mention
even if not of a response.
Mele then considers another possibility: ‘‘Suppose a philos-
opher, Velma, were to claim that the constitutive aim of deci-
sion* is making up one’s mind what to do on the basis of
relevant states of mind from which one is not alienated and in a
way that does not involve any proscribed Freudian processes.’’
How could decision have a constitutive aim of ‘‘making up
one’s mind what to do on the basis of relevant states of mind’’?
To begin with, anything that qualifies as ‘‘making up one’s
mind what to do’’ already qualifies as a decision. Identifying a
constitutive aim of decision (if there were such a thing – which I
doubt) would be a way of analyzing what a decision essentially
is. And the analysis of what a decision is can hardly be that it is
something aiming to be a decision.
What is worse, Mele’s proposed constitutive aim refers to
making up one’s mind ‘‘on the basis of relevant states of mind.’’
The main reason for analyzing decision in terms of a consti-
tutive aim would be to explain how a person’s attitudes acquire
the relevance of reasons in light of that aim. To identify an aim
that presupposes their relevance would therefore be pointless,
since it would leave us still in need of some basis for explaining
how and why they are relevant.
None of the candidate aims proposed by Mele is shown to
solve any problems in the philosophy of action. Each is pro-
posed solely on the grounds that it is associated with some
intuitively plausible criterion of success. But as I explain in both
‘‘The Possibility of Practical Reason’’ and ‘‘Deciding to De-
cide,’’ my purpose in trying to identify a constitutive aim of
action is to find a non-normative foundation for our norms of
practical reasoning. Hypotheses about the constitutive aim of
DISCUSSION ON THE POSSIBILITY OF PRACTICAL REASON 287
action earn credibility, in my view, not by resting on unsup-
ported normative intuitions, but by explaining various other-
wise inexplicable aspects of agency. Supported by this inference
to the best explanation, they can provide independent support
for practical norms, by generating criteria of success for action.
In this connection, consider Mele’s argument that action
might have a constitutive aim and yet be subject to an unrelated
criterion of success, such as conduciveness to eudaimonia. Mele
considers how I might respond, as follows:
It is in this connection that [Velleman] presses his analogy between action*
and belief. A proper understanding of what belief is reveals, one may say, a
double-duty ‘‘norm of correctness’’ – truth. Truth, it may be claimed, is the
‘‘constitutive aim’’ of belief and determines what counts as a reason for
believing. Suppose that claim is true. Even so, no one has shown that ac-
tion* is like belief in this regard. No one has shown that action* is such that
its constitutive aim determines what counts as a (good) reason for acting …
Whether philosophers of action should try to develop convincing arguments
for these theses about action* is an open question.
How does Mele imagine that one might ‘‘show’’ that action is
analogous to belief in being subject to reasons generated by its
constitutive aim?
Here is how I have tried to show it: by showing what it would
explain.1 In ‘‘What Happens When Someone Acts,’’ I try to
show that this hypothesis would explain how events can be
brought about by agents instead of other events. In ‘‘The Pos-
sibility of Practical Reason,’’ I try to show that the hypothesis
would explain how reasons for acting can depend for their
influence on an agent’s motivational makeup without being
constrained by his contingent motives for acting – in short, how
the hypothesis would resolve the debate about internal and
external reasons. In ‘‘Deciding How to Decide,’’ I try to show
how the hypothesis is preferable to pragmatic considerations as
an explanation for the normative force of reasons for acting. In
‘‘The Story of Rational Action,’’ I try to show that the aim of
self-knowledge, in particular, would explain how the axioms of
decision theory gain their force as norms of practical reason. In
‘‘Epistemic Freedom,’’ I show that the associated, epistemic
conception of intention would explain the openness of the future
DAVID VELLEMAN288
from the deliberative perspective. In ‘‘How to Share an Inten-
tion,’’ I show that the same conception would explain the pos-
sibility of an intention’s being shared.
None of these arguments amounts to a deductive proof that
action is analogous to belief. All that they are intended to
establish is that the analogy is worth exploring, because of its
explanatory power. Mele complains that the analogy has not
been proved, but he does so without addressing a single one of
my arguments.
3. HUSSAIN
I am grateful to Nadeem Hussain for reading my book and
criticizing it so incisively. His criticism gives me a welcome
opportunity to rethink my view and provide some clarifications
and corrections.
To begin with, Hussain is quite right to question my char-
acterization of the ‘‘story of rational guidance’’ in ‘‘The Guise
of the Good’’. I cannot defend the passages that he quotes, in
which I say that the propositional contents of reasons for acting
must be intrinsically justifying, independently of the attitudes in
which they are fixed. As he notes, these passages are an attempt
to explain how Davidson came to associate desires with value
judgments. I think that my explanation can be reformulated to
avoid the problems raised by Hussain; but as he also notes, the
important question is not which story of rational guidance I
attribute to Davidson but which story I accept on my own
behalf; and these passages cannot be salvaged for that purpose.
Instead of attempting to replace them now, however, I will
move on to other questions.
One of Hussain’s questions about my view is whether it
conceives of an agent’s awareness of reasons as an awareness
of their being reasons or rather as an awareness of that about
them in virtue of which they are reasons. In my view, what
makes a consideration into a reason is its relevance to an
integrative conception of the action for which it is a reason – a
conception that would situate the action in an explanatory
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context of motives and circumstances. A reason for doing
something, as I put it, is a consideration in light of which doing
that thing would make sense. Hussain seems to assume that an
agent’s merely grasping the explanatory relevance of a con-
sideration to an action would not constitute an adequate grasp
of the reason’s justifying force. And if I understand him cor-
rectly, his grounds for this assumption is that the agent’s
perceiving a consideration merely as explanatorily relevant
would leave an ‘‘open question’’ as to whether he ought to do
that which it would help to explain. In order to close that
question, Hussain believes, the agent must grasp the consid-
eration under the concept of a reason, since the question
whether he ought to do what he has reason for doing is not
genuinely open.
In my view, however, whether to do what makes sense is not
an open question, either – not, at least, insofar as the subject is
thinking about what to do. If a person stops assimilating his
own behavior into his understanding of the world, he may then
be unmoved by the greater intelligibility of some available ac-
tions over others. But in that case, he will have stopped
deciding what to do – will in fact have stopped exercising
agential control over his behavior. Once he stops trying to bring
his behavior under descriptions that would embody integrative
knowledge of what he is doing, he has stopped considering that
behavior in the context of reasons, or conforming that behavior
to intentions, and so he has stopped functioning as an auton-
omous agent. So long as he continues to function as an agent,
he will aim at making sense of his behavior, with the result that
explanatorily relevant considerations will not be matters of
indifference to him.
Thus, there is no open question whether to be swayed by
explanatorily relevant considerations – no open question for an
agent, that is. There may be, in some sense, an open question
whether to be an agent, whether to get into or stay in the
agency game. But of course someone who is not already in the
game is in no position to entertain that question, because
entertaining it entails thinking about what to do, which entails
trying to bring his behavior under descriptions that would
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embody knowledge of what he was doing. Anyone who asks
himself whether to get into the agency game is already in the
game; and anyone who asks himself whether to stay in the
game cannot answer in the negative without staying in it at
least that far. Of course, such a person can leave the game in a
final exercise of agency – say, by taking drugs or jumping off a
bridge or just dozing off for a while. But reasons for someone
to act are not reasons for him to start or continue functioning
as an agent; they are reasons for him in so long and so far as he
functions as such.
I therefore favor the view that Hussain assumes I must reject
– namely, the view that an agent is exposed to the force of a
reason when he perceives its explanatory relevance to the ac-
tion for which it is a reason. One advantage of this view, I
believe, is that it provides a plausible explanation for weakness
of will, as I explain briefly in a footnote to the Introduction of
the book (p. 28, n. 34). An agent can be influenced by con-
siderations in their capacity as reasons without necessarily
conceiving of them as such. Insofar as he does think of con-
siderations under that description, he may be mistaken about
whether they are influencing him in the relevant way, or whe-
ther he is not being influenced even more by other consider-
ations that he has not acknowledged under that description.
An agent’s enumeration of the reasons for him to act may
therefore be mistaken as to the considerations that are in fact
weighing with him in the manner of reasons. That is why he
can act for reasons while failing to do what he judges himself to
have most reason for doing: because the influence of reasons
upon him is not mediated by his judgment about reasons so
described.
This response to Hussain’s first question leads directly into
his second question, which is whether I have adequately ac-
counted for the normativity of reasons. This question has also
been raised by Kieran Setiya,2 and the corresponding question
about my account of belief has been raised by Nishiten Shah.3 I
will want to make some concessions to Hussain, Setiya, and
Shah on this question, and so I should spend a moment
explaining what I take the question to be.
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My response to Hussain’s invocation of the open-question
argument was that, insofar as someone is an agent, the ques-
tion whether to do what makes sense would not actually be
open for him, since his agency will just consist in his behavior’s
being regulated by the aim of making sense. The question of
normativity is whether the agent’s disposition to do what
makes sense should be described as a disposition to do what is
justified by reasons. This disposition makes explanatory con-
siderations influential with him, but should their influence be
valorized as rational – indeed, as the very mainspring of his
rationality?
This question becomes especially acute in light of my insis-
tence (e.g., on pp. 19–20) that the constitutive aims of belief and
action need not be aims of the agent’s, since they may be aims
of some sub-agential or sub-personal systems instead. If the
processes regulating the agent’s cognitions and behavior really
are sub-personal, then he should be able to assess them from a
detached perspective, just as he can assess the way his nasal
mucosae are disposed to swell upon contact with cat dander, or
the way his palms are disposed to sweat when he is in unfa-
miliar company. The former disposition is due to regulatory
mechanisms that are constitutive of immunity, the latter to
mechanisms constitutive of the fight-or-flight response. The
mere fact that these mechanisms are performing according to
their design does not oblige the agent to approve of them, does
it? And if the processes regulating his cognitions and behavior
are likewise subject to his approval or disapproval upon
reflection, how can they be constitutive of his theoretical and
practical rationality?
Come to think of it, though, I have reason to reject this
analogy. The basis of the analogy is the possibility of a reflec-
tive assessment such as Harry Frankfurt imagines in his hier-
archical theory of agency: reflecting on his allergies or his social
anxieties, the agent can find them deplorable, and so he should
also be able to deplore the mechanisms regulating his cogni-
tions for truth or his behavior for intelligibility. In ‘‘What
Happens When Someone Acts?’’,4 however, I argue that the
agent cannot attain a perspective of fully detached reflection on
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the aim constitutive of action, because it is an aim that must be
operative in order for him to reflect, in the first place. At the
end of the Introduction, I suggest that the resulting inalien-
ability of our intellectual drives is what Aristotle has in mind
when he says that a person appears to be identical with his nous,
his understanding. There is no perspective in which the drive to
understand is not behind the lens of introspection, even if also
in front of it, because no mental processes that were not reg-
ulated by this drive would be sufficiently coherent to constitute
a perspective at all:
Your understanding is … like that point between your eyes which consti-
tutes the visual standpoint from which you see whatever you see, even when
you view that point itself in the mirror, at a distance. Just as that point is
always ‘‘here,’’ at the origin of your visual images, even when it’s also ‘‘over
there,’’ in the mirror; so your understanding is always ‘‘me’’ in your
reflective thinking, even when you regard it externally, as ‘‘it.’’ It’s your
inescapable self … [31]
Revisiting these passages under pressure of the present crit-
icism, I now realize that I was too hasty in saying that the
constitutive aim of action can belong to the agent’s sub-per-
sonal systems rather than the agent himself. I am committed to
the view that the inclination toward this aim is the agent,
functionally speaking, in that behavior guided by it is in fact
attributable to him, as his doing. I would still insist that the
constitutive aim of action is not the agent’s end, insofar as an
end is something that the agent understands himself as pursuing
and thus accords a potentially justifying role in his practical
reasoning. But on reflection, I do not want to say that it is
alienable from the agent.
Yet the agent’s inability to withdraw from his intellectual
drives does not entail that he must approve of them, and it
certainly does not entail that he must approve of them as that
by appeal to which considerations qualify as reasons for acting.
Even if the agent is inextricably identified with these drives,
what gives them rational authority as opposed to brute moti-
vational force?
At this point, I want to borrow a page out of Shah’s book
and substitute it for several pages of mine.5 Shah has developed
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a norm-expressivist analysis of belief-attribution. To classify a
cognition as a belief, he claims, is, among other things to
express acceptance of alethic norms in application to it. In the
course of defending this analysis (at a length to which I cannot
do justice here), he points out that insofar as the human mind is
designed to regulate some cognitions for truth, the norms
expressed by classifying them as beliefs will be syntonic with
how the mind already works. Accepting alethic norms in
application to these cognitions will then amount to endorsing a
part of our own nature – though it may involve a commitment
to making that part of our nature more reliable and consistent.
Now, this idea of accepting norms that ratify but also
regularize some part of our nature is especially congenial to
my conception of practical reason. When norms are accepted
consciously, they not only guide our behavior but also provide
generalizations with which to understand the behavior so
guided. When we adopt the posture of being ‘‘for’’ some
things and ‘‘against’’ others, we thereby adopt a comprehen-
sive description for some region of our conduct, where we
then gain an additional incentive to follow suit, so as to be
comprehensible under that description. The process posited by
Shah is therefore a natural step along the practical short-cut
to self-knowledge, a way of making sense of ourselves by
making sense to ourselves. Whereas I previously suggested
that the norm of truth is emergent from, or can be reduced to,
the way our cognitions are regulated when they qualify as
beliefs, I am now inclined to say, along with Shah, that the
norm of truth is a norm that we apply to cognitions that are
largely regulated for truth already but become more intelligi-
ble to us by virtue of being consciously and more thoroughly
regulated under that norm.
Here I am disavowing the project, announced in the
Introduction to my book, of reducing the norms governing
belief to naturalistic facts about belief. One of the advantages
of publishing a collection of papers is that the format
accommodates inconsistencies, and one of the advantages of
inconsistency is the possibility of being right half of the time.
In this case, I think that I was right to say, in the final chapter,
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that a naturalistic reduction of doxastic norms was not on my
agenda.
But what about the practical norm that is generated,
according to my view, by the constitutive aim of action?
Whereas the correctness of believing the truth, and the incor-
rectness of believing falsehoods, are almost universally accepted
as norms, the same cannot be said for the correctness of doing
what makes sense, and the incorrectness of doing what does
not.
No sooner is that concession uttered than I am tempted to
retract it: of course the correctness of doing what makes sense is
universally acknowledged. Talk of what makes sense to do is
pervasive in the contexts of deliberation and advice. As I ex-
plained in my response to Dancy, however, there is a reading of
the phrase ‘‘what makes sense’’ that is of no help to my view,
and I cannot rule out the possibility that what makes sense
under this reading is all that’s generally acknowledged to be
correct. For if what makes sense is understood as that which is
favored by the balance of reasons for acting, then the correct-
ness of doing it is obvious but also trivial, so that it cannot be
the basis on which considerations qualify as reasons, to begin
with.
Mine is not the vacuous claim that reasons are consider-
ations in light of which actions are seen to be supported by
reasons; it is rather the substantive claim that they are con-
siderations in light of which actions are intelligible, can be ex-
plained and hence understood. And this cognitive reading of
‘‘what makes sense’’ strikes many philosophers as quite irrele-
vant to correctness in action.
Here my view runs into that intellectual brick wall which is
consequentialism. Unfortunately, what Aristotle had to say
about means-end reasoning in the practical syllogism is easier
to understand than what he had to say about the relation be-
tween eudaimonia and to kalon (‘‘the noble’’, or ‘‘the fine’’), the
former of which is not a result of the latter but rather super-
venes on its pursuit. Philosophy thus inherited a prejudice in
favor of instrumental rationality, a prejudice subsequently
reinforced by Hume’s distinction between reason and passion,
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and then by the formalization of decision theory, which lent
means-end reasoning the aura of scientific respectability.
That the result is nothing more than a prejudice becomes
clear upon an honest survey of the reasons for acting that we
offer and accept in real life. To be sure, a means-end syllogism
can be cobbled together for most courses of action. Cobble as
you will, however, you will never produce a syllogism that
expresses the force of justifications like the ones that I cited in
my Precis:
Why are you whistling?
Because I’m happy.
Why aren’t you having any wine?
Because I don’t drink.
Why worry about his problems?
Because I’m his friend.
Why are you shaking your head?
Because I think you’re wrong.
Why do you have her picture on your wall?
Because I admire her.
Here already?
I’m punctual.
A theory of practical reason needs to explain what these justi-
fications have in common with one another and with instru-
mental justification. And the explanation cannot be that all of
them can be shoe-horned into instrumental form, since not all
of them can, and the ones that can are sorely pinched in the
process.
The preceding, admittedly polemical remarks, and the ones
to follow, are intended to sketch the philosophical outlook
from which my hypothesis about practical reason originates. If
you think that the norms of practical reason are already well
understood, then novel hypotheses on the subject will strike
you as unnecessary and perhaps even unwelcome. But I think
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that the norms of practical reason are not understood at all. In
my view, practical reason is a subject on which philosophy is in
a backward state of ignorance. The blithe assurance with which
philosophers continually assert that reasons for acting are de-
sire-belief pairs indicates, not that we have attained a stable
understanding of the subject, but rather that we are still in the
grip of myth and superstition. What else can explain the
unquestioning acceptance of a theory that is so obviously
inadequate to the phenomena?
The rational norm of making sense, in my understanding of
the phrase, can subsume and explain the norm of instrumental
justification while also accounting for the other forms of jus-
tification illustrated above. Given that the norm is implicit in
those forms of justification, why not entertain the hypothesis
that it is explicit in our practical discourse, whenever we talk
about what it makes sense to do? Why assume that such talk
uses a different sense of the phrase from the one that it has in
other contexts?
Thus, I do not concede that the norm of making sense is
irrelevant to practical reason as we know it. All I am willing to
concede is that it is irrelevant to practical reason as caricatured
in philosophy. I think that we adopt this norm in order to
regiment and make sense of a process by which our actions are
already regulated, just as we adopt the norm of truth in order to
regiment and make sense of the regulation of our beliefs. What
we are making sense of, in this case, is the very process of
making sense of what we do by doing what makes sense. My
hypothesis, then, is that the natural process of attaining prac-
tical knowledge affirms itself, by leading to the adoption of a
norm that ratifies and regularizes it as the process of practical
reasoning.
NOTES
1 See p. 158, where I characterize one of my arguments as an argument to
the best explanation.
2 ‘‘Explaining Action,’’ forthcoming in The Philosophyical Review.
3 ‘‘How Truth Governs Belief,’’ forthcoming in The Philosophical Review.
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4 See also ‘‘Identification and Identity’’, in Sarah Buss and Lee Overton
(eds.), Contours of Agency, MIT Press, 2002, pp. 91–123.
5 At present Shah’s book is only metaphorically such. The ideas I am
borrowing were developed in the course of his dissertation research. See also
note 45 of Shah’s ‘‘How Truth Governs Belief ’’.
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